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We propose two quantum bit commitment schemes which are unconditionally secure. A crucial
feature of the new schemes is that the quantum states are prepared by the receiver (Bob) instead
of the sender (Alice). Our results contradict the widely accepted claims that unconditionally secure
quantum bit commitment is impossible.
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Quantum correlation is a fascinating and mysterious
property of quantum mechanics that has so far evaded
our comprehension. The reason is that quantum corre-
lated phenomena are often counter intuitive, and seem
to imply the existence of some kind of unknown action-
at-a-distance. In 1935, Einstein, together with Podolsky
and Rosen (EPR) [1], used it in his last attempt to show
that quantum mechanics is incomplete. In 1965, Bell
[2] derived his celebrated inequality which cast the EPR
arguments in a quantitative form that can be tested ex-
perimentally. Bell’s result was later generalized in 1969
by Clauser et al. [3]. In 1982, Aspect et al. [4] per-
formed the denitive experiments, which conrmed that
quantum correlation does violate intuitive expectations
(or local realism) [5], in the manner predicted by quan-
tum mechanics. Over the years, quantum correlation
has found interesting applications in the eld of quan-
tum cryptography [6], which was initiated by Wiesner
[7] around 1969. The idea is to use only the laws of the
quantum world to guarantee the security of various pro-
tocols, instead of adopting classical means whose security
against espionage can never be proven. Quantum cryp-
tography encompasses many sub-elds such as quantum
key distribution [8,9], quantum oblivious transfer [10{12],
quantum bit commitment [13{15], quantum coin tossing
[8,13], and so on. In particular, quantum bit commit-
ment (QBC) is a basic protocol, or primitive, from which
many of the other more sophisticated protocols can be
constructed.
A bit commitment protocol usually involves two par-
ties, say Alice and Bob. Alice decides upon a bit (b =
0 or 1) in her mind, which she wants to communicate to
Bob at a later time. In order to guarantee that she will
not change her mind in the interim period, Alice agrees
to lock her commitment in a safe, sends it to Bob, but
keeps the key. At the moment of truth, Alice unveils her
commitment (value of b) and opens the safe to prove her
honesty. A bit commitment protocol is secure if (1) Al-
ice cannot change her initial commitment without being
discovered, and (2) Bob has no way of nding out about
Alice’s commitment before she discloses it. In a typical
classical implementation, Alice writes down her commit-
ment on a piece of paper and locks it in an ordinary
safe. Clearly the security of such a scheme is quite un-
predictable, since it depends entirely on Bob’s inability
to pick the lock. In a quantum bit commitment (QBC)
scheme, Alice locks her commitment in a quantum safe,
in the form of a chain of correlated multi-body quan-
tum systems. Unlike the classical world, in the realm of
quantum mechanics, an act of espionage (or illegal distur-
bance) would cause irreversible and detectable changes
to a wave function. The hope is that, with quantum sys-
tems, it may be possible to design a QBC scheme that is
unconditionally secure, which means that it is unbreak-
able even if Alice and Bob were endowed with unlimited
computational power.
In 1993, a QBC scheme (BCJL) was proposed [14]
which was for some time thought to be unconditionally
secure. That belief was later proven to be misplaced
by Lo and Chau [16] and Mayers [17,18]. Lo and Chau
proved the insecurity of a broad class of QBC schemes
which includes the BCJL scheme. Mayers [17] also dis-
cussed more general situations and claimed to have ruled
out the possibility of unconditionally secure QBC once
for all. The purpose of this paper is to show with two
concrete examples that the contrary is true.
To start with, it is helpful to recapitulate the argu-
ments leading to the proof of Lo and Chau [16]. They
considered the following class of QBC schemes:
(1) Commitment: Alice chooses the value of a bit b (0 or






i jA(b)i i1 jB(b)i i2, (1)
where α(b)i are constants, and fjA(b)i ig and fjB(b)i ig
are sets of independent and normalized wave functions.
These wave functions are also known to Bob. Alice makes
a measurement on particle 1 in jψ(b)i, records the out-
come, and sends particle 2 to Bob. This procedure is re-
peated n times (n is called the security parameter), and
the set of particles Bob receives from Alice constitutes the
quantum safe which holds Alice’s secret commitment.
(2) Disclosure: At a later time, Alice opens her commit-
ment by revealing the value of b and the results of her
measurement.
(3) Verication: Bob measures the particles in his pos-
session and checks whether his results are properly corre-
lated with Alice’s in accordance with the wave function
jψ(b)i. If so, he is convinced that Alice is honest.
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This scheme has been shown to be insecure because
of the following observation [16,17]. In order that Bob
cannot prematurely obtain any knowledge about Alice’s




must be independent of b (in the ideal case). It then fol-
lows from Schmidt’s Theorem [19,20] that one can rewrite










λi jA^(1)i i1 jB^ii2, (4)
where λi0s are the eigenvalues of ρB , and fjA^(0,1)i ig and
fjB^iig are sets of orthonormal bases in their respective
Hilbert spaces. We see that, in these forms, the dierence
between jψ(0)i and jψ(1)i lies entirely in Alice’s sector.
Hence, using an appropriate unitary operator U(1), Alice
can rotate jψ(0)i into jψ(1)i,
jψ(1)i = U(1)jψ(0)i, (5)
or vice versa, without the help or knowledge of Bob. This
is the Achilles’s heel of the class of QBC schemes de-
scribed above.
Relation (5) allows Alice to devise a safe cheating strat-
egy: Without rst making a commitment, she prepares
n jψ(0)i states and sends particle 2 in each state to Bob,
leaving particle 1 untouched. Alice waits until just be-
fore the moment of disclosure to decide the value of b. If
b = 0, she simply measures the particles in her posses-
sion as prescribed. If b = 1, she rst transforms jψ(0)i
to jψ(1)i and then performs the measurements. Finally
she discloses her commitment and the data to Bob, who
will then happily conrm that everything is ne. Hence,
by delaying her measurement until just before the mo-
ment of disclosure, Alice can cheat without fear of being
caught.
Without referring to an explicit scheme, Mayers [17]
went further to claim that unconditionally secure QBC
is impossible in principle. We note that, in both works,
the cheating strategy requires Alice to rotate jψ(0)i into
jψ(1)i immediately before the disclosure phase. A natu-
ral question to ask is: What if Alice must send all the
particles to Bob at the end of the commitment phase? A
scheme proposed by Ardehali [15] in 1995 has this feature.
However it is still insecure due to an EPR-type attack,
namely, Alice can initially generate quantum states with
higher degrees of freedom, and retains the extra degree
of freedom to influence correlations at Bob’s end. From
the above discussions, one may conclude that, as long as
the quantum states jψ(b)i are prepared by Alice, no QBC
scheme can be unconditionally secure. Therefore in the
new QBC schemes to be proposed below, we shall let
Bob prepare the quantum states. Such an arrangement
may sound self defeating at rst, since intuitively Alice
would never agree to put her secret in a safe provided
by Bob whom she does not trust. However as we shall
see, for a quantum safe, there are ways to guarantee the
secrecy of Alice’s commitment. As a result, we are able
to circumvent the ‘no-go theorem’ [16,17] and show that
unconditionally secure QBC is possible.
Without loss of generality, we shall formulate our new
QBC schemes using Pauli spinors for spin-1/2 particles.
The two-body spinors jSSzi are classied by the total
spin quantum number S, and its z-axis projection Sz.
Two of the triplet states are given by
j11i = j ""i, j1 − 1i = j ##i, (6)
from which we can dene a linear combination,
j1, ε^ i  eiφ/2cos(θ/2)j ""i+ e−iφ/2sin(θ/2)j ##i, (7)
where ε^ = (θ, φ) is an unit vector. The spin-spin correla-
tion function is dened as
Pϕ(e^, e^0)  hϕj ~σ1  e^ ~σ2  e^0 jϕi, (8)
where ~σ are Pauli matrices, and e^ and e^0 are unit vectors.
Eq. (8) yields,
P11(e^, e^0) = eze0z, (9)
P1,ε^(e^, e^0) = εx(exe0x − eye0y) − εy(exe0y + eye0x) (10)
+eze0z.
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j "ε^i = e−iφ/2cos(θ/2)j "i+ eiφ/2sin(θ/2)j #i (13)
is an eigenstate of ~σ  ~ε, satisfying
~σ  ε^ j "ε^i = j "ε^i. (14)
We now introduce the rst of our new unconditionally
secure QBC schemes [21]:
(1) Commitment: Alice and Bob agree on two security
parameters n and m. Bob generates a sequence (S) of n
jΨi states, and, for each state in S, he sends the pair (1,
2) to Alice. This process is repeated m times. From the
m sets of particles received from Bob, Alice randomly
chooses one to be used in the protocol, and tests the
rest for signs of deceit. Specically, she checks that the
overall spin-spin correlation and spin expectation values
are given by
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h~σ1  e^ ~σ2  e^0iS= eze0z, (15)
h~σ1,2  e^iS= 0. (16)
Bob is caught cheating if any one set does not pass the
test, and the protocol is stalled (just as if Alice is caught
cheating). Otherwise Alice proceeds to inform Bob which
set of particles is chosen. Next, if b = 0, she makes no
measurement; if b = 1, she measures each (1, 2) pair in
the set along the z-axis and records the results in a list
LR. Finally she sends the (1, 2) pairs back to Bob in a
randomized order recorded in a list LΨ. Alice keeps LΨ
and LR secret.
(2) Disclosure: At a later time, Alice reveals the commit-
ment bit b, LΨ, and LR (if b = 1).
(3) Verication: With LΨ, Bob can restore the (1, 2)
pairs to their original positions in S, and hence re-
establishes the correct grouping of particles belonging to
the same wave function. If b = 0, Bob measures the spin
of particle 3 along an arbitrary axis ε^. According to Eq.
(12), if particle 3 is found to be spin-up (spin-down) along
ε^, then particles 1 and 2 must be in the j1, ε^i (j1,−ε^i)
state, and hence their spins have to be correlated accord-
ing to Eq. (10). If b = 1, Bob measures all three particles
along the z-axis. The outcomes should be either j """i or
j ###i with equal likelihood, and they must be consistent
with Alice’s data recorded in LR.
If Bob does not want to store the particles for an indef-
inite length of time, he can measure particles 1, 2, and 3
along three arbitrary axes, as soon as the (1, 2) pairs are
returned from Alice. This changes nothing for the b = 0
case. For b = 1, the sequence S can be divided into two
groups according to the data in LR (i.e. Sz = 1), and
Bob must now check that correlations between any two
particles obey Eq. (9), and in addition,
h~σi  e^i1 = ez, h~σi  e^iS = 0, (i = 1, 2, 3). (17)
Clearly this scheme is unconditionally secure if both
parties faithfully follow the instructions. For instance, if
Alice initially chose b = 0, and wants to switch to b = 1,
she would have to correctly guess the outcomes of n spin
measurements along z^, and the chance of success is of
order
p
n(1/2)n. Furthermore, since the positions of the
(1, 2) pairs in the sequence S have been randomized by
Alice, before she releases LΨ, a dishonest Bob can only
examine the overall spin correlation between particles 1
and 2, disregarding the spin of particle 3. If b = 0, Al-
ice makes no measurement, therefore the reduced density
matrix for particles 1 and 2 is given by




j ""ih"" j + j ##ih## j
)
, (18)
On the other hand, if b = 1, Alice measures particles 1
and 2 along z^, reducing S to a mixture
S 0 =
{
j """i, j ###i
}n
, (19)
where the states occur with equal probabilities. Since
S 0 gives rise to the same ρ12 as given in Eq. (18), Bob
cannot prematurely gain any information about Alice’s
commitment.
In order to keep Bob honest in preparing the sequence
S, the new scheme stipulates that Bob must generate
m copies of S, from which Alice randomly selects one
for the protocol, and checks that all the rest satisfy Eqs.
(15, 16). It is not hard to see that any other sequences,
which give the same ρ12 as S [see Eq. (18)], would also
pass the test and vice versa. For example, a class of such
sequences (mixtures) is given by
Sε^ =
{
j1, ε^ ij "i, j1,−ε^ ij #i
}n
. (20)
However they are by denition not useful to Bob for
cheating purposes. A possible route of attack for Bob
goes as follows: Among the m sequences of wave func-
tions generated, he mixes in an odd one which can reveal
Alice’s commitment before her disclosing it (but would
not pass the test); for instance, a sequence of n j1, x^i’s
would do. It works if Alice by chance picks the odd se-
quence for the protocol; otherwise, Bob would be caught
cheating. The chance of success is 1/m, which in princi-
ple can be made arbitrarily small. However since Bob’s
success rate is already 1/2 by pure guessing, this cheating
strategy is obviously not worth trying if m > 2.
The next important question is whether this scheme
is susceptible to EPR attacks? The answer is no. A
crucial feature of the new scheme is that, for each state
jΨi, Bob possesses a particle (3) which is entangled with
the pair (1, 2) sent to Alice. As a result, Alice cannot
substitute particles 1 and 2 with something prepared by
herself without being discovered. On the other hand,
if Alice returns the particles to Bob as instructed, she
would have no more control over the quantum states at
the end of the commitment stage. Consequently EPR
attacks cannot work here. Furthermore, for b = 0, the
spin correlation between particles 1 and 2 depends on
the arbitrary axis ε^ along which Bob chooses to measure
particle 3. Since Alice’s chance of predicting the direc-
tion of ε^ is innitesimal (for large n), so is her chance of
breaking the scheme by whatever means.
Next, we consider another unconditionally secure QBC
scheme which is theoretically an improvement over the
one already proposed, but is practically harder to imple-
ment.
(1) Commitment: Bob generates a sequence (S) of n jΨi
states, and, for each state in S, he sends the pair (1, 2)
to Alice. If b = 0, Alice makes no measurement; if b = 1,
she measures the particles along the z-axis and records
the results in LR which is kept secret. Next Alice applies
to each (1, 2) pair an unitary transformation,
Ui(1, 2) = Ri(1)Ri(2) (i = 1, ..., n), (21)
which rotates the particle spins at random, before send-
ing them back to Bob.
(2) Disclosure: At a later time, Alice unveils the value of
b, the series of unitary transformations fU12(i)g, and the
data list LR (if b = 1).
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(3) Verication: Bob rst undoes Alice’s random rota-
tions by applying the conjugate transformations fU y12(i)g
to the (1, 2) pairs. Then he can proceed to verify Alice’s
commitment as in the rst scheme.
This scheme is also unconditionally secure, because (i)
Clearly Bob has no way of learning about Alice’s com-
mitment before she discloses fUi(12)g, even if he had not
been honest in preparing the quantum states, (ii) The se-
quences S and S0 [Eq. (19)] are not connected by unitary
transformations, so that Alice cannot cheat by misin-
forming Bob about fUi(1, 2)g, and (iii) As explained be-
fore, due to the existence of particle 3 and Bob’s freedom
to choose the measuring axis ε^, the scheme is immune to
EPR or any other types of attacks. This second scheme
has the advantage that Bob needs to generate only one
copy of S. It is also in a sense more robust than the rst
one, since Bob has no possible cheating strategy at all.
On the other hand, the scheme requires Bob to store the
particles for an indenite length of time; moreover Alice
and Bob must be able to rotate the particle spins while
maintaining quantum coherence at the same time. Con-
sequently, this scheme would be relatively more dicult
to implement.
In real situations, systematic (transmission) errors are
unavoidable. For the schemes to work properly, the error
rate must be known, and both Alice and Bob must take
it into account when they check the spin observables.
In summary, we have proposed two new QBC schemes
which are unconditionally secure. Our results contradict
the claims of impossibility in the literature [16,17]. A cru-
cial feature of the new schemes is that the quantum states
are prepared by the receiver (Bob) instead of the sender
(Alice). Specically, Bob generates a sequence of n three-
particle states jΨi [21], given in Eq. (11), in which two
of the particles are used to carry Alice’s commitment,
while the third one safeguards the scheme against EPR
or any other types of attacks by a dishonest Alice. Se-
curity against Bob is achieved by randomizing the wave
functions reversibly at the end of the commitment phase,
so that no information is leaked to Bob prematurely.
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